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TO : Chief, EC  
FROM : Chief of Station, Germany  
SUBJECT: Operational/CASE  
INFO: Robert BURKHARDT Case  
Reference: FRAM-1721, 25 July 55

Attached hereto is an edited stenographic copy of the briefing given by [ ]  
to General Phillips on 25 July on this case.

APPROVED [ ]

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**SECRET** 8 July 1955

CASE FILE

1. On 30 June, this year, OA was informed by the Mo. Bonn, that they were planning a large roundup on the 2d of July. A roundup of spies, no details were given at this time. On the 2d of July, our Pfullach office informed us that this roundup was one started on the basis of information given by one Robert EBERHARDT alias KURT NEUMANN, who is in prison on the basis of cold BILDUNGSPARTY charges, and he was offering information on persons in contact with the Stasi in return for his freedom from prosecution. Two of the persons indicated by NEUMANN as Stasi agents were employees of the GERMAN organisation Robert KIENZLE and Leibnitz. On the 2d of July, our GPO Liaison Officer learned from GPO Headquarters that the German authorities in conjunction with GPO and the GERMAN Organisation had conducted a so-called "Laupe operation" on the weekend of 2/3 July, rounding up fifteen (15) people including the two above mentioned Stasi people. On the 7th, I was seeing Dr. EBERHARDT, chief of the Stasi. I see him periodically on matters of common concern which mostly involves exchange of basic information, and at this time, he told me a capsule account of this roundup. He volunteered the fact that the two GERMAN men had been arrested and he gave a general account of NEUMANN's disclosure. I asked him immediately if there was any U.S. security aspect to this case. He said, "Yes and no." Yes, to that end, (initially) as employee of the German Post Office in Frankfurt had established his pattern of telephone conversations; but that other than this and the two GERMAN people, there were no U.S. security aspects apparent at that time. He said that the Germans had made no admissions, but he said this was a tentative judgment. He said, "Yes and no." Yes, to that end, (initially) as employee of the GERMAN Post Office in Frankfurt had established his pattern of telephone conversations; but that other than this and the two GERMAN people, there were no U.S. security aspects apparent at that time. He said that the Germans had made no admissions, but he said this was a tentative judgment.

2. saw EBERHARDT a couple of times after that and he really had nothing to add until the 19th of July. On the 19th of July, he gave me a list of fifteen (15) arrested, the names of which I have here, but I will, for the sake of brevity, give them to you in writing. Some of them had admitted their Stasi association, others had denied it. ALBRECHT, the principal witness in this whole thing, landed himself on the 18th of July, the other GERMAN man, KIENZLE, had and has consistently denied any Stasi connection. In addition to this, EBERHARDT gave me the following information: which he cautioned was "very vague and incomplete" he said that "they were trying through further analysis of the material to pin it down. There is a female language instructor in Oberammergau who is an alleged Stasi Informer also a male Bavarian truck driver in Oberammergau who had given NEUMANN information as the source he contacted there. They have no further identification on either of these people. There was a married female employee of an unnamed American hotel in Garmisch who was alleged to be a German agent (Ado) and finally, an American unlisted man allegedly

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with CRC in Wiesbaden, is supposed to be in close contact. This GR's Headquarters are believed to be in the vicinity of Leibnizstrasse 1, in Wiesbaden. Now, let me put the story together for you a little bit.

3. ALBERT was a GERMANY case officer. Precisely what his duties were at the time we don't know. He is putting them together for us. He reported a large amount of the material to Pollock to put it together for us. An account of material found in ALBERT's home, at the time of his arrest. A study of these two sets of material showed the following facts:

ITEM 1. ALBERT received reports regularly from one Helmut SCHURZ, a retired KREUZ case, living at Schulstrasse 1, in Schleissheim, which is near FRANKFURT. SCHURZ has reportedly serving with a US Intelligence office headed by a Colonel HENKEL, described as being the (2) section, five (5) counterintelligence, very busy, but not far, according to SCHURZ. Information this office was gathering information on the following targets: the Helm case; the BLAINE office; Department VI (Public Safety) of the Ministry of Interior; the WEISSE Organ in the MILITARY Ministry; the DSVI and the SD. The nature of the information contained in these reports made it apparent that the office of Col. HENKEL was concerned primarily with the security of these offices.

ITEM 2. The reports which SCHURZ submitted contained a variety of information on members of these offices; personality information, names, personal friends, that kind of thing. Much of the material was mere rumors, three and four lines long, of biographical information where the man lives, where he works, etc., etc.

ITEM 3. ALBERT transmitted to GERMANY excerpts from these reports to which he added information concerning the Col. HENKEL office which he had obviously obtained from SCHURZ orally. I say obviously, since information which got into DISCHER's hands from ALBERT was not contained in the copies of reports which SCHURZ had passed to ALBERT and which were found in ALBERT's home.

ITEM 4. Col. HENKEL's office was allegedly closed in bad October 1952 until sometime in 1953 when it moved to FRANKFURT. Late in 1953, SCHURZ indicated to ALBERT, who passed it on to GERMANY, that HENKEL's office was transferred to the direct control of CRC in Paris.

ITEM 5. The specific HENKEL's which Col. HENKEL gave to SCHURZ prior to the report which SCHURZ prepared in answer to these HENKEL's were passed to ALBERT and thence to GERMANY, and showed with relative clarity the properties which Col. HENKEL's office had been able to take against the various targets. It became apparent that SCHURZ had sources in most of the target areas; for example his source on the HENKEL case was a lawyer named KLEINER, KLEINER lives in Wiesbaden and has practically dropped his private practice to clear up the mystery of the HENKEL case. SCHURZ sources in SD were DISCHER, who is a personal friend and apparently unwilling informant of SCHURZ, also one HANS LANGEWOLD, who was a member of the Chancellor's bodyguard and

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was transferred to the squad in charge of the protection of the prime buildings in Berlin and finally, to the SS trolope room. It appears that SCHURZ also had informants in the BfV Ministry of Interior and the BfAK office, although these have not yet been identified.

ITEM 6. ALBERT was informed through SCHURZ, who learned it through LIEFENAU, of the impending SS roundup, of the 4th of July, although the details didn't appear in the report which SCHURZ passed to ALBERT. I can give you an idea later of just about what that report contained.

ITEM 7. SCHURZ had informed SCHURZ about the disciplinary action which was being carried on against SABERG in connection with war crime accusations made against him while he was in Italy. He also passed remarks relative to his personal opinion about the fact the SS was handled. Interestingly enough, neither of these two items was passed on by ALBERT to USSTAF.

ITEM 8. Insofar as SCHURZ's remarks to me are concerned, they were

that SCHURZ, (as we unknown), asked his American chief, Col. SHAW, for a

raise from \$800 DM's to \$90, DM's a month and a separation allowance of 220 DM's

a month since he had to maintain two separate residences in order to carry on

his work. These are the basic revelations from the studies of these two

bodies of information (I am still on the 19th day of July and BRUNCKEN's

talk with me).

ITEM 9. SCHURZ was interrogated in Karlsruhe on the 10th and the 20th of July as a witness, (not accused), and his story contained the following items of primary interest - bear in mind that I did not have a recorder with me and I was able to jot down only the high points. ALBERT knew SCHURZ during his police days and they had become good personal friends. SCHURZ made no secret to SCHURZ of the fact he, SCHURZ, worked for an American Intelligence Office. When SCHURZ was charged with war crimes, in an effort to exonerate himself, he contacted GSA. He was able to provide from American files, a body of information which helped secure his innocence. He was free from the charges; however, that information was passed by GSA direct to the Ministry of Interior, not to BfV. SCHURZ, and he had no indication of anything happening or how the Ministry was evaluating it; so knowing that SCHURZ was working for the American Office, he turned to SCHURZ in hope that SCHURZ office could bring further pressure to bear - just another lever in the fire for SCHURZ.

ITEM 10. In the course of his relationship with SCHURZ, SABERG said,

discuss his opinion of what was wrong with the leadership of the SS.

ITEM 11. When SCHURZ returned from his interrogation on the 20th of July, SCHURZ was waiting for him at SCHURZ's house and asked him what he knew about the death of ALBERT. SCHURZ was a very close family friend of ALBERT's and he had allegedly learned of ALBERT's death from his, ALBERT, by impression is, and I can't guarantee this, that SCHURZ did confirm the fact of ALBERT's death to SCHURZ; nothing more. SABERG also knew ALBERT directly, but this was only back to the 30's when SABERG was instructor at the police school at which ALBERT was a student. They were not personal

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friends; they had not seen each other except informally, casually and occasionally since the war. In other words, LEXICHEV's claim, if true, it was, was allegedly fabrication, nothing of official nature and nothing that probably doesn't go on in government circles all the time. There is really nothing on the book.

RECENTLY and information available does not impeach him in any way other than his connection with these two items.

b. LEXICHEV was interrogated in Kursk on the 10th of July. I might interpolate here in saying that the names of both SAVENOV and LEXICHEV were contained in a report which SAVENOV had passed to Col. KIRKUS, the original and carbon copy of which had gone to ALBERT, and reported fifty or sixty names of his sources and potential sources in the German government, and that, as how the names of SAVENOV and LEXICHEV came to the attention of the SO men, they have decided to get to them as soon as possible. LEXICHEV at first denied having furnished SAVENOV any information. One day after he was brought home from Kursk, he called the Federal Attorney and said he'd like to settle that denial and make another statement, which he did. His statement had in it the following points:

"a. He had known both SAVENOV and a man named Richard SCHNEIDER during the war. SAVENOV, like LEXICHEV, was a Volksdeutsche (ethnic German) from Lithuania. They met - LEXICHEV and SAVENOV - in Bad Goisberg in 1951 by accident and had a reunion there about the old days in Lithuania. SAVENOV again revealed to LEXICHEV that he worked for an American intelligence office and after a number of local meetings with LEXICHEV, asked if he would help him and his American office in filling some of the gaps in their information. LEXICHEV claimed he couldn't do this because he was only a member of the Chancellor's bodyguard and as such, he had no access to such interests; however, he did supply a few such which SAVENOV seemed to be happy to get. Before long, SAVENOV was paying LEXICHEV 200 DM's a month.

b. Sometime in 1954, LEXICHEV was transferred to the Volksapo room of the SO and they was able to furnish more interesting information, although still very brief reports, since the detailed staff was always sent by despatch. In early July, LEXICHEV claims that SAVENOV approached him, saying that his office had information that a large number of spys was going to take place and asked if LEXICHEV could supply some information on it. LEXICHEV claimed that from his experience he knew that the Americans were receiving information officially from various German security offices and saw no reason why carrying out this request would be damaging to anyone; so he reported and this report was found in ALBERT's files; that a person, who had been "qualified" in Kursk, was then removed to KIEV and ordered information which had lead to the SO roundup which was called "Operation KETTEN". Also that SAVENOV was known to have visited Kursk recently, possibly in connection with this planned operation, and that GORDON had visited the SO on 17-June-1955. Possibly also in connection with this operation, LEXICHEV claimed to have received the information on the PROGRESS and GORDON movements from colleagues of his in the course of informal and shortly after the arrests were made between the 2d and 12th of July, GORDON and LEXICHEV to be sent, without notice, one above KIEV and one to ALBERT, had been arrested. (It is my impression that LEXICHEV will continue the arrest of ALBERT).

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Q. The final item from BRUNSWICK is that it was his impression that Col. THOMAS was to have met SCHMITZ in Bonn on the 18th of July. Now that is the story.

5. I'd like to give you BRUNSWICK's comment. None of the information which SCHMITZ passed on to ALBERT contained any State secrets. They were largely rumors, gossip, and unofficial character. Secondly, SCHMITZ has not yet been interviewed nor has SCHREIBER. The reason I mentioned SCHREIBER is this: his connection is because it is not clear to me nor the SP whether SCHREIBER worked for SCHMITZ only as a sub-source or whether he worked together with SCHMITZ directly for Col. THOMAS. BRUNSWICK said when he heard the physical description of Col. THOMAS - I quote: "I pointed out to BRUNSWICK that he had better take another look. First of all, I am slightly under two meters, five centimeters tall, and secondly I don't think I can be described as 'strong but not fat'. That at once cleared up the matter. BRUNSWICK did discuss those theories of Mierwitz both GEMER and the Federal Attorney in Karlsruhe; but I am led to believe that I am off the hook with all people. I pointed out that I'd hardly be establishing liaison with the office I am passing through. Thirdly, BRUNSWICK has not discussed this case with any other US agencies and free his standpoint, will regard us as the middlemen in making inquiries of other U.S. agencies. He asked if I would make inquiries in the rest of the intelligence community after I assured him that this was not our operation. In accepting this request of his, I made it clear to him that we stand in no operational relationship to any military agency and therefore we can be responsible for no action taken by any military agency, either to make or not make SCHMITZ available for interrogation. He agrees not to take any action against SCHMITZ or SCHREIBER until he hears from me. That is the story.

6. I called to BRUNSWICK on the telephone the other night. He added that a Mr. "B.", had been mentioned in some report which had been found - must be in the GERMACH batch - in a context which made it look as though Mr. "B." was either a colleague or the predecessor of Col. THOMAS. That is the only clue we have no description or anything else. (Note: It has since emerged that this referred to Mr. Robert BRECKMUD.)

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